Introduction
Flooding is a frequent concern across the US since damage to buildings and equipment is hard to reverse. The US Government maintains a subsidized flood insurance program which conveys local risk through designated flood zones. Changes in climate, local development, and outdated prevention can shift risk beyond these zones. As a result, households will learn about risk through experience and update their expectations. Consistent with this, Gallagher (2014) shows that insurance take-up jumps significantly after floods. This implies that historically flood-prone places tend to be insured. In places with low flood history, destructive events will both increase insurance take-up, as flood risk increases, and reduce the size of the community. Less destructive events, on the other hand, will increase insurance take-up but will not change the size of the community; only house values may decline as documented by Bin and Polasky (2004) and Hallstrom and Smith (2005) . This paper examines the extent to which flood-risk revisions, on their own, can affect the size of the community and real estate values over time. The effect of a higher risk can be minimized through insurance. Yet, this raises the cost of living in the community, either directly by new zoning requirements or by rational choice. Additionally, there are other costs such as foregone wages and temporary relocation expenses which are not insurable.
Higher risk can, therefore, make a location less attractive compared to other places with similar characteristics but unchanged flood risk. Durability of houses already in place, as in Gleaser and Gyourko (2005) , ensures that when risk increases, following smaller floods, population will be stable -house prices will compensate for the insurance cost. However, in the case of growing communities with new construction, newcomers, who choose among a set of destinations, may steer away and build somewhere else. Increases in the flood probability can, therefore, affect the size of the community, especially if it has been an attractive destination prior to the risk revision.
I evaluate the responses of population and housing after risk revisions related to unusual but small flooding. Expectations are the main driver since damages are not sufficient to affect the house supply or local productivity. I compile a new comprehensive dataset of insured and uninsured damage for 4,147 communities in 38 states between 2003 and 2013 that allows for consistent comparison. The total number of buildings completely destroyed in the past 25 years allows me to separate communities with low and high flood history.
Those below the state median are considered low history/high surprise. Restricting flood surprises to communities with zero prior housing destruction does not change the evidence.
The main results compare the experience of these two community types after floods. Since productivity or amenity factors can generate very different growth patterns across locations and can interact with risk revisions, I further divide locations based on their pre-flood growth.
Finally, I examine the regional heterogeneity of the national results, the risk spillover to neighbors, and the role of local social capital.
The evidence suggests that flood history is related to local perceived flood risk. Locations with high flood history have a higher footprint in a flood zone, more insurance purchases, and a higher insurance coverage. They have almost 25% higher insurance payouts after a flood, even when controlling for total losses. This likely reflects not only the higher number of people required by the flood zoning to purchase insurance but also the higher perceived risk in the proximity. It also suggests that flooding occurs mostly within the established flood zone. Population and house values in these communities are not affected after flooding.
Places with low flood history depend less on insurance -they have less people in a flood zone, less active policies, and lower total coverage. This suggests that when floods do occur they are not widely expected and constitute surprises. Smaller payouts after events indicate that floods occur outside the flood zone or that insurance take-up within the zone is small.
In a simple specification, population in the year following the event declines by 0.3% relative to a fixed effect and a linear trend. This effect is persistent and also includes a break in the pre-flood trend, which has a significant long-term impact on population when compounded.
In a specification with additional controls these effects increase substantially: 1.2% drop on impact and 0.6% drop in pre-flood trend. The population effects are mostly driven by attractive communities with positive pre-flood growth. They see a persistent 1.4% dip in population with a 0.7% decrease in the pre-flood trend. Population is not affected in the non-growing places. Instead, they see close to a 4% drop in real estate values, with the biggest effect among higher tier housing, which is likely closer to water. This is consistent with evidence from Gleaser and Gyourko (2005) where adjustments in house values can limit population changes. There is no such a compensating decline in the attractive communities and as a result adjustments occur through population. This is possibly driven by previous strong demand for new housing and expectations that flood impact is transitory. Regional evidence strongly suggests that the population decline in attractive communities after a flood surprise is a general phenomenon across the nation.
All together, the results suggest the following interpretation. Flood surprises drive upward revisions of the underlying probability of a future flood which in turn raises the cost of living. In locations where demand for housing is low existing structures are sold at a discount that covers the additional cost. This appears to be sufficient to maintain the existing population trajectory. In location where demand for housing is high structures are not sold at a discount, possibly due to expectations that the pre-growth will be maintained, which drives new movers to other destinations.
Climate change will likely cause some significant flood events but, more importantly, it will also change expected risk across a much wider set of communities. The evidence here helps understand how risk affects where people live and how much they pay for housing.
Historical flood experience results in the institution of local preventive measures such as zoning, which requires mandatory insurance coverage. Consequently, additional flooding is in line with expectations and only generates insurance payouts. Flood surprises, on the other hand, deviate from expectations and raise flood risk. In the cases when damage is limited, higher risk does not just force higher insurance purchases, as shown previously in the literature, it also reduces the total number of people that choose to live there. The attractiveness of the community determines the ultimate impact of surprises: strong demand for new housing means that population is mostly affected; weaker demand implies that house prices are mostly affected. The evidence in the paper also emphasizes that a general economic analysis of the impact of natural disasters has to account for changes in perceived risk, particularly where damages are small. This paper can be placed within several different literatures. First, it is related to the broad literature on location choice and the spatial labor market equilibrium (Moretti (2011), Gleaser and Gyourko (2005), Gleaser and Gottlieb (2009), Diamond (2014) ). This paper is close in spirit to Topel (1986) who also emphasizes the importance of expectations in the location choice. This literature generally investigates the effect of Bartik-style productivity shocks across local markets on migration, real estate prices, and wages. The shock I study affects expectations about the future cost of living but has a minimal effect on local productivity since most of the damage is relatively small. Second, the paper is related to the literature on natural disasters. This literature mostly focuses on the effect of hurricanes at different geographical levels and measures damage in a variety of ways. The current study also includes hurricanes since they produce significant flood damage. Strobl (2011) uses wind speed as a proxy for damage and finds that hurricanes lower county GDP by 0.5% and do not change total population but affect its composition. Deryugina (2017) uses hurricane paths and simulation estimates of damage to examine the disaster and non-disaster transfers to affected communities as well as the effect on demographic and economic variables. She finds that population is not affected. Both papers utilize county-level data based on estimates of damage based on hurricane locations. I use community-level losses that are consistently imputed by federal agencies and do not rely on associations between wind speed/hurricane path and damage. Importantly, I show how important historical flood experience or flood preparedness is for how communities are impacted. The papers in this literature emphasize the effect of total damages, while I focus on locations where there are more uninsured losses.
The response of the real estate market has been studied extensively within this literature. Bin and Polasky (2004) focus on one county and one hurricane and find price declines within the flood plane. Hallstrom and Smith (2005) focus on a different county and show that a "near miss" hurricane still lowers prices in the flood plane. Murphy and Strobl (2010) find that coastal cities see increases in house values after hurricanes. My paper provides evidence based on a considerably larger sample and focuses on overall prices in the community. Third, this paper is related to the literature on expectation formation and learning after rare events.
It is close to Gallagher (2014) which examines the change in insurance take up after flood events. The paper concludes that flood events lead to revisions of perceived risk which lead to higher insurance purchase that is not very persistent. The evidence is complementary to my findings since it suggests that living in flooded communities becomes more expensive.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional details of the flood insurance program and describes how the flood data was compiled. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 examines the regional heterogeneity of the main results.
Section 5 includes extensions and robustness and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Flooding Dataset and Institutional Details
Flood insurance in the US is administered by the federal government through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The program makes insurance available at communitiescities, towns, townships, counties -that maintain a flood zone map and enforce local building code. The map delineates Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) with varying degrees of flood risk. Two general SFHAs are the 100-year and 500-year flood zones where flood is expected to occur with certainty every 100/500 years respectively. The risk within the 500-year SFHA is not uniform -areas close to the 100-year zone will have a higher risk of flooding if the geography is similar. Insurance purchase is mandatory for structures within the 100-year zone but not required elsewhere. This is important because risk expectations rather than local regulation will determine the insurance purchase outside of the 100-year zone.
The flooding dataset is based on information from NFIP on insured damage and from FEMA/Small Business Administration (SBA) on uninsured damage. The sample includes 38 US states which feature disaster declarations related to flooding. The level of aggregation is at the community level which includes 4,147 distinct location with median size of 34 thousand people. The insured damage is matched to actual disaster declarations which, in turn, are associated to uninsured damages. In only 75% of community/year cases total losses are based on insured and uninsured damage. All together, total damage in the data has four components: insured individual/business from NFIP; uninsured individual from FEMA and SBA; uninsured business from SBA; uninsured public from FEMA. In this paper I focus primarily on total damage. The components are only used to control for events where most of the damage comes from one of the source. Additional information about the data is provided in Appendix A2. Finally, I have limited information on total insurance policies and total coverage for a subset of years in the sample.
Population information comes from the annual US Census estimates for cities and towns.
The geographical detail of this data maps directly into the community level of the flood damage data. Locations with less than fifteen thousand people are combined with the county balance areas to make sure that results are not driven by very small settlements.
Real estate information comes from the Zillow service and is available at the zip-code level.
It provides estimates of house values separated into three tiers. These are calculated by splitting the price distribution of all housing into three parts and reporting the middle point of each. Any zip-code level information is imputed to the level of the community by using census-block-based population weight for each zip code. The rest of the information used in this paper comes from the 2000 US Census data at the block-group level.
The paper identifies floods according to the relative size of the damages. Cases where more than 0.01% of the total real estate value of the community is destroyed constitute a flood event while the rest are censored. I focus on a wide spectrum of events because relative damage is context specific -less destructive floods can have significant impact on perceived risk if they occur in areas with no flood history. I also replicate the main results in the paper using a cut-off of 0.02% (the 25 th percentile) and after dropping locations with damage over 8.66% (the 95 th percentile). These are listed in the online appendix.
The first panel of Figure 1 shows all communities that flooded between 2003 and 2013.
Flooding appears to be widespread across the country and not only a coastal phenomenon.
In the interior major floods result from significant rain or snowmelt which causes rivers and creeks to spill in the surrounding areas. Some of the communities in the sample experience repeated disasters during the sample period. I will separate these into a different category since their event study explicitly includes an interim period. Furthermore, the fact that these places flood so frequently suggests that they are fundamentally different from the rest of the The second panel of Figure 2 separates the high/low surprise locations. These tend to be contiguous suggesting that flood surprises occur when a flood extends beyond a high-risk area and into a low-risk one. High-risk areas also tend to be contiguous to multiple-flood areas which reinforces the assumption that the former are at a generally higher risk of disaster.
The map also confirms that high/low surprise locations are relatively close and are part of the same economic area. 
Main Results
One of the main results in the paper is that the extent to which disaster damages affect a community is determined by its historical experience. Figure 3 shows the population growth for each of the communities.
We see that the population in Milford was not affected. At the same time the communities with smaller overall damage but with relatively low history of floods experienced population declines. Notice that the communities did not experience a large-scale disaster since damages were relatively small. Nevertheless, they seem to have changed the expectations about future flood risk and the attractiveness of the communities with low history.
Flood Surprise and Insurance Payouts
The first set of formal results examine the extent to which historical flood losses can be used to identify flood surprises. Regulations require that structures within the 100-year flood zone carry insurance if they have a federally-backed mortgage. Insurance purchase for any other structures will depend to some extent on the perceived risk of a flood. High flood history increases perceived risk and leads to insurance purchase. I examine this relation by comparing the average insurance payouts across the high/low flood history groups in the cross-section of all events. In particular, I test whether a given amount of total damage (insured and uninsured) generates more insurance payouts in locations with historical exposure to flood events i.e. low-surprise communities. I estimate:
where P ayouts is total insurance payouts per capita after an event at community i and α t is an year effect. I also estimate the model using active insurance policies for the set of communities where this data is available. Table 3 shows the estimation results. Communities with a low-surprise flood i.e. high flood history have a significantly higher insurance payouts per capita during an average flood event. This is consistent with the higher number of active insurance policies observed.
These locations receive almost double the insurance compensation after an event compared to locations with low previous experience with flooding. Column 2 of Table 3 looks at the regional heterogeneity of this result. I find that high history is associated with higher insurance payout across the US regions. Notice that the Mid-Atlantic and South Atlantic region have higher than national average payouts but even there low surprise communities receive higher amounts. It is possible that low surprise events generate more insurance payouts because they experience more damaging events. Column (3) accommodates this by controlling for overall damage. 1% increase in total damage leads to 0.43% increase in insurance payouts at communities with low history of flooding and 0.66% increase in payouts at high flood history locations. Communities with previous floods 50% more of the damage through insurance compared to the rest. Column (4) shows that this result is consistent across regions of the US. Interestingly, the Mid-Atlantic area covers a bigger proportion of the overall damages with insurance but history of flooding still drives higher payouts.
Columns (5) and (6) show that affected low-surprise locations have more active insurance policies and that the payout results are not driven by higher real estate values.
Overall, the results provide further confirmation of the group differences observed in the summary statistics. Locations with a history of flooding anticipate future damage and take out more insurance. The results also suggest that high damages in general do not necessarily lead to high impact on the local economy, outside rebuilding activities, because those may be in line with expectations and do not change the perceived risk.
Population Responses
Next I examine how the population is affected by flood events focusing on surprises and the level of attractiveness prior to the event. I estimate the following model in several variations:
Log population for community i within state s in year t is explained by an individual average, α i , individual linear trend, t i , and a state-year effect, γ st . This specification is flexible enough to allow for time-invariant difference in settlement size and community-specific difference in the population trajectory. The former is important given the heterogeneity in community size in the data. The latter accounts for differences in productivity, amenities, and prior flood events which give rise to different population changes across locations. The state-year effect captures variations in local population which can be traced to the state/national level.
The Great Recession is an important factor in the sample which has affected population and even if the community is hit by a flood. Additionally, flood events lead to an inflow of emergency/construction/temporary workers. These will likely be housed in communities with higher capacity of rentals. This is the reason why I control for the rental share. This control will not be sufficient if these additional workers are placed in temporary housing.
In this case it is important to examine the persistence of the estimated flood impact since temporary workers will lead to a reversal of the initial impact as they leave. Higher P ostF estimate is consistent with outflow of temporary workers.
The baseline results assume that the level of flood surprise does not affect the responses. For that to happen they need additionally to be affected by a productivity shock. Although both factors are important I focus on the effect of the higher-frequency shock and simply control for the other one. The effect of flood surprises is identified in model (3) and (4). In both cases they lead to significant declines in population on impact and in the following periods. An average location from (3) is only affected when the flood is unexpected. On impact expected population drop by 0.3%; the effect is persistent; pre-flood trend declines by 0.15% after the event.
Compared to (1) where floods do not affect population we see that identifying surprises is critical. This is consistent with the insurance results and suggests that revisions of flood risk disrupt the pre-flood population dynamic. In the case with controls flood surprises generate significantly bigger declines in population: 1.2% decline on impact, 1% in the post period, and 0.6% decline in pre trend. Low surprise floods also affect population. Interestingly, the regional results show that this effect is not a nation-wide phenomenon but comes from the northeastern region. Both estimates (3) and (4) strongly suggest that expected population declines when a flood occurrence breaks with historical experience. While the initial decline in population is persistent it is still relatively small at 1%. The trend break represents a much bigger impact on the population of a community following the event. A 0.6% decline in the pre-trend amounts to a 3%/6% lower population in 5/10 years relative to where population is expected to be without the flood. The fact that most events have relatively small magnitude implies that the effect stems from revisions of risk expectations. Consequently, biggest population changes will not necessarily overlap with biggest damages. Flooding seems to lead to some population increases in places with more diversified local economies and more rental capacity. This offsets the negative effect from the increase in riskiness. In the cases of flood surprises the second effect is much stronger and leads to overall decrease in population.
The evidence so far shows that surprises disrupt the pre-existing population trajectory.
A decline in the linear trend implies a slow down in expansion and stabilizing of population in a growing location; in a stable or declining place it implies loss of population or an acceleration of such loss. To help interpret the trend break I separate the impact effects according to pre-flood growth: positive and negative growth in the preceding five years.
This also helps understand how a productivity/amenity shock interacts with risk revisions.
The results in (5) and (6) show that the surprise driven population decline occurs primarily in attractive communities with higher pre-flood growth. Population drops by 0.55%/1.4%
without/with controls and remains lower in the post period. There is a decline in the pre trend of 0.4%/0.8%. These communities effectively stop expanding after the flood surprise and population becomes fixed at its pre-flood level. Locations with declining population are either not affected (with controls) or see an increase (without controls). The difference in outcomes by pre-growth after the surprise strongly suggests that the population decline works through the demand for new housing or excess of newcomers. This is consistent with a decrease in the attractiveness of the community following a revision of expected flood risk. Importantly, it requires that the real estate market does not fully compensate the risk increase with a discount that offsets the cost of insurance. Similarly, the fact that lower growth communities are not affected suggests that the real estate there may be discounted providing compensation for higher risk.
Results in (7) and (8) show that a stricter definition of flood surprise is associated with stronger declines in population. They imply that some of the locations with positive historical destruction likely anticipate future flooding. Yet, given that the estimated coefficients are similar this is not a big concern. Finally, Table A1 in the online appendix shows that the results are not changed when I increase the cut-off for a flood event to 0.02%, which is the 25 th percentile of the baseline sample as seen in the summary statistics. The results are also not affected when I drop locations with more than 8.66% of damage, which is the the 95 th percentile of the baseline sample for locations with multiple flood events. These results are listed in Table A2 in the online appendix.
It is important to point out an issue that relates to the possible endogeneity of flooding and local economic factors such as high poverty. It is possible that poor communities invest less in flood protection and ultimately experience bigger damages. Here it really matters how poverty or a local economic factor is related to the population trajectory before the flood and after the flood. If either of these cause population to be decreasing before the flood then I incorporate this in the model by allowing the trajectory to be different before the flood.
For an impact to be significant in this case we have to see that population declines even more than suggested by pre-flood rates driven by poverty or an economic factor. If these factors cause population to respond differently only after the flood i.e. a poor place grows just as rich place before the flood then it is hard for me to disentangle the effect. I can only do it by allowing poor places to respond in a different way after the shock. I accommodate this possibility with a set of controls described above.
Real Estate Responses
I examine how the housing market responds to surprises and more specifically whether there is evidence of compensating effects by estimating the most restricted version of the model as in (6) above. Results are listed in Table 5 for each of the three tiers provided by Zillow.
There is no evidence that housing values compensate for the increase in flood risk at locations with high pre growth. This is the case for all three tiers of housing. This is consistent with the decrease in population following the event in that potential movers into the location see an increased cost associated with the destination -both the insurance premium and uninsurable damage. The persistent demand for new housing before the event or the expectation that the event is transitory seem to prevent house prices from adjusting.
Interestingly, housing in low growth communities declines after a surprise. Top and middletier housing decrease by 2.3%-3.4% on impact; the dip is persistent and remains at close to where demand for housing is low existing structures are sold at a discount that covers the additional cost. This appears to be sufficient to maintain the existing population trajectory.
In location where demand for housing is high structures are not sold at a discount, possibly due to expectations that the pre-growth will be maintained, which drives new movers to other destinations.
Low wealth incidence
The decline in house prices is consistent with turnover in the community whereby higherrisk tolerant households replace less-risk tolerant ones after a reduction in prices. This leaves population unchanged but alters the type of people remaining. This is an example of sorting based on changes in perceived risk. It relies on the assumption that households can finance their exit from the community by trading their house for a comparable structure somewhere else. If this is not the case sorting will not take place as people are prevented from leaving.
This is an example of a lock-in effect as in Stein (1995) .
I examine the extent to which low wealth can explain the lack of population changes in low growth areas. I do this by using the FEMA relief payments data. Guidelines from the agency imply that lower income applicants for disaster relief will be given non-refundable payments as opposed to loans. A lower-wealth household will be able to pay lower amount out of pocket and therefore will likely be given a higher non-refundable payment for a given amount of damage. I test whether flood incidence among low-wealth households is higher in low growth communities by examining total FEMA payments per damage recorded and how they differ in low-growth communities. In particular I estimate:
where FemaPay is total relief payments per capita, Dam is total damages recorded, and α Y is a year effect. The specification estimates the fraction of damages disbursed by fema, β, and allows this to be different for low-surprise events, γ 1 , and at low growth locations, γ 2 .
Positive γ 2 indicates that FEMA disburses more per given amount of damages in low growth locations, a result consistent with higher low-wealth incidence of flooding.
Results are shown in Table 6 . The national cross-section, ( for new housing seems to prevent a compensating decline that offsets higher risk. The cost increase is consistent with population decline.
Regional Results
The main results are based on a national sample which combines locations across various geographies each with specific climates and regulatory settings. The econometric specification accounts for this heterogeneity with the individual average, trend, and state-year effects but
we cannot be certain that the identified responses are a general phenomenon occurring across the country. It is possible that population responds strongly only in one area of the US with there being no effect elsewhere. Additionally, I have also argued that real estate variations are closely related and help understand population effects. It is important to confirm that this relationship is maintained within separate regions. I investigate within-country heterogeneity by allowing the main coefficients to vary by a grouping based on a mix between Census divisions and regions -region 1 is split into Northeast and Mid-Atlantic; region 3 is split into South Atlantic and South Central.
The regional results for population are listed in Table 7. The table includes without confirming that they hold at the regional level.
Regional real estate results for top-tier housing are shown in Table 8 . We see no real estate depreciation in any of the regions for high-surprise/high-growth locations. The only exception is the Northeast region which sees a trend break. This supports the interpretation of the population declines. The case of the South Atlantic is somewhat different. High-surprise/high-growth areas do not experience population decline on impact -they see a trend break. This implies that population was not significantly affected and demand for new housing persisted. Uninterrupted population is reflected in the increase in house prices for this group. This suggests that expected flood risk may not have adjusted significantly after the flood surprises. Alternatively, it is likely that the high-surprise group includes locations where risk is already perceived to be high -consistent with the insurance estimates for South Atlantic in Table 3 .
Housing depreciates in low pre-growth communities in all regions except for the Midwest and South Central. The price reduction paired with minimal changes in population in these locations is consistent with turnover in the local population where some sorting based on risk occurs. In the case of Midwest and South Central there are both minimal population changes and no price adjustment. Living in these areas effectively becomes more expensive but the real estate does not provide compensation. The evidence from the FEMA payments suggests that at least for the South Central area the incidence of the disaster may be higher on low-wealth households. This can explain why we do not observe any population effectsthese communities are locked in.
Overall, the regional results for housing and population are closely matched. They provide evidence for the interaction between revisions of perceived flood risk and existing demand for new housing which ultimately determine whether more people will inhabit risky locations.
Extensions and Robustness Flood Spillovers
The results in the paper shed light on the effect that floods have on other locations that may not themselves be affected. To accommodate this I extend the baseline model in two important ways: add a set of indicators in X it that allow the impact, persistence, and trend- The evidence is shown in Table 9 . Model (1) estimates the baseline results with the addition of controls for floods occurring in the neighboring counties. We see that the results are robust to this set of controls. In Model (2) shows that locations that are not affected directly but are within an affected county experience a decline in population and a trend break. This is consistent with an increase in perceived risk and further supports the point that the impact of floods events works mainly thought change in expectations. Model (3) separates the previous effect depending on whether the nearby floods were surprises. The results are mixed suggesting that proximity to high surprises being marginally significant.
It is not obvious a-priori if low or high surprise floods will have different spillover effects.
The evidence suggests that low-surprise floods have stronger population effects. Models (4)-(6) examine the effect on real estate values. We see negative spillovers on top-and midtier housing. The spillover of a high-surprise flood has a stronger effect on prices which is consistent with the weaker population impact.
Relative Damage vs Flood Indicator
The results in this paper use an indicator for a flood based on a cutoff for minimum relative where risk increases will experience population declines leading to stabilizing of population at the pre-flood level. Third, locations where risk increase and where demand for new housing is low will not see changes in population but will experience depreciation of housing. Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.F is an indicator for flood event. PostF is an indicator for the period following the first year of impact. PostTrend is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event.
Tables and Figures
LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative population growth 5 years prior to the event. Estimation (7) and (8) Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Top/Middle/BottomTier refers to the log of the respective house price Zillow index. F is an indicator for flood event. PostF is an indicator for the period following the first year of impact. PostTrend is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event.
LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative population growth 5 years prior to the event. Sample: 2000/2016. SE clustered by community. Additional controls: indicators for top 66 th perc. of fema/insured/business/sba damage; above median non-construction-based local economy; above median renter fraction; below 33 th perc. tot. damage. Table 6 : Low-wealth Incidence in Low-Growth Communities Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Tables (for online publication Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.This table replicates the main results in the paper using a higher cut-off for a flood event. Relative Damage below 2bps is censored. F is an indicator for flood event. PostF is an indicator for the period following the first year of impact. PostTrend is a linear trend starting the in the period following the impact. LSurp/HSurp is an indicator for a low/high surprise event.
LGr/HGr is an indicator for positive/negative population growth 5 years prior to the event. Estimation (7) and (8) Appendix 2: Data Construction (for online publication only)
NFIP maintains an official record of the number of policies sold, total coverage, and total payouts at the level of a given community since the program effectively partners with the local authority enforcing the flood map and building code. The geographical level is consistent with the US Census definition of general-purpose government units such as cities, towns, townships, as well as the remaining county areas (county balance). I focus on 38 states with FEMA disaster declarations related to flooding. Table 1 lists the states considered. Median population across the 4,147 communities in 38 states in the sample is 34 thousand people. Insurance information includes homeowners and business structures. NFIP does not list payouts associated with particular flood events. Instead, it shows up-to-date payouts starting from 1978. I use historical observations of the official record taken approximately twice a year between 2003 and 2014 to calculate the amount of new payouts claimed at each community. These represent insured damages associated with flood events during each year. I carefully link the observed payouts to the set of FEMA disaster declarations for each state. The matching was not automated but involved reading the description of FEMA declarations for each state/year and associating flood events in the covered counties to observed insurance payouts at communities in those counties. This link allows me to identify both the amount of insured and uninsured damages for each FEMA event. In approximately 25% of community/year cases total losses are based only on insured damage. This is consistent with the fact that not all communities in counties with disaster declarations will have significant uninsured losses.
The uninsured damages are sourced from FEMA's individual/public assistance data and from Small Business Administration's (SBA) individual/business lending data. A disaster declaration makes federal funding available to affected individuals without insurance. They can receive either a direct non-refundable payment or a highly subsidized loan depending on their ability to take on additional credit. FEMA administers the direct payments and SBA extends the loans. Both maintain a registry that identifies the amount of assistance provided and the related total damage at the zip-code level for each disaster declaration. Altogether, total damage in the data has four components: insured individual/business from NFIP; uninsured individual from FEMA and SBA; uninsured business from SBA; uninsured public from FEMA. In this paper I focus primarily on total damage. The components are only used to control for events where most of the damage comes from one of the source.
Relative damage is calculated using an estimate for the total value of the real estate during the year of a flood. The value is calculated using information from the 2000 Census at the block level. I add the total housing values listed in the Census across all of the value categories for a total real estate value in 2000. I then use the annual state house values from the FHFA to project the 2000 values forward for each year.
Zip-code data is associated to community-level data using block-level population weights. In particular each Census block lists the total population, the zip-code, and the community. This allows me to assign zip-code values to communities by appropriately weighting using population.
Data on flood insurance policies is only available for the years of 2002-2006 and 2010.
